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care, and doctors (especially when self-employed) have to con-
vince people of their competence and care (Steinkopf 2012;
2017). Further, the rituals and structure of contemporary medi-
cine still play an important role in highlighting and legitimizing
patients’ need for care. Although health belief systems have
largely changed from spiritual to biological, parallels between con-
temporary medicine and shamanism are evident. Although
medical training no longer requires celibacy, the arduous and pro-
longed training can be considered a similarly transformative event.
Interestingly, the duration of medical training in Western medi-
cine has remained at six or seven years since medieval times at
least, despite great differences in availability of useful biomedical
knowledge (French 2003). Further, patients usually go to doctors
with the expectation of receiving acknowledgment of their sick
states by being prescribed treatments, often leading to the pre-
scription of pure or impure placebos or even overtreatment
(e.g., Faessler et al. 2010; Howick et al. 2013; Meissner et al.
2012). Although the prescribed treatment is ineffective or even
harmful, it contributes to the legitimization of the patient’s suffer-
ing as well as to the doctor’s reputation. On the one hand, the
doctor’s acknowledgement of the patient’s sick state manifested
in diagnosis and prescription is a signal to the community for a
legitimate need for relief and care. On the other hand, a doctor
generously prescribing treatment and thus acknowledging the
patient’s needs may develop a better reputation (and more eco-
nomic success) than a medical miser who treats only when treat-
ment is indicated (Fabrega 1997; Steinkopf 2017).
In sum, the shaman has to persuade patients and onlookers
through a healing spectacle, and the sick individual has to con-
vince others of a sick state, incapacity, and a need for care. Both
may have a shared interest in making the healing encounter
appear effective, because it supports the shaman’s claim of exper-
tise and the patient’s adoption of the sick role. Modern doctors
also act and compete in terms of satisfying expectations and build-
ing community consensus around the sick person’s need for care.
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Abstract: Singh’s cultural evolutionary theory posits that methods of
inducing shamanic altered states of consciousness differ, resulting in
profoundly different cognitive states. We argue that, despite different
methods of induction, altered states of consciousness share
neurophysiological features and cause shared cognitive and behavioral
effects. This common foundation enables further cross-cultural
comparison of shamanic activities that is currently left out of Singh’s
theory.
Singh’s cultural evolutionary theory successfully accounts for mul-
tiple aspects of shamanism as a recurrent phenomenon. When
addressing the evolution of shamanism, however, Singh rejects
altered states of consciousness (ASC) as a crucial element, consid-
ering these less important than other elements, such as behavioral
adaptations. He further claims that different methods of inducing
ASC have “profoundly different physiological and psychological
effects” (sect. 4.2, para. 1). One of Singh’s reasons for setting
aside ASC as explanatory is that he thinks the ASC used by
shamans do not have a common neurophysiological basis. Yet,
this claim is unsubstantiated. Here, we suggest that ASC both
share certain neurophysiological features and give rise to shared
cognitive and behavioral effects.
Altered states of consciousness induced by methods as varied as
sensory deprivation, shamanic drumming, trance, meditation,
endurance running, hallucinogen consumption, and even epilep-
tic seizures produce shared cognitive and behavioral effects,
including hallucinations, out-of-body experiences, ego dissolution,
enhanced imagery, and a distorted sense of time (see Castillo
1990; Danielson et al. 2011; Dietrich 2003; Forgays & Forgays
1992; Hayashi et al. 1992; Kjellgren et al. 2003; 2008; Mason &
Brady 2009; Speth et al. 2016; Suedfeld 1980; Suedfeld & Eich
1995; Vaitl et al. 2005; Zuckerman & Cohen 1964). These
shared effects are not likely to be coincidental; rather, it is likely
that ASC share certain neurophysiological features that corre-
spond to these cognitive and behavioral effects. Although there
is as of yet no consensus as to what these shared neurophysiolog-
ical features are, it is worth reviewing some evidence supporting
the view.
One line of evidence comes from using electroencephalography
(EEG) to compare ASC with non-altered states. EEG results indi-
cate that ASC, regardless of induction method, correspond to
greater activity in the low-frequency bands – delta, theta, and
slow alpha (see Takahashi et al. [2005], Batty et al. [2006], Cahn
& Polich [2006], and Fox et al. [2013] for meditation and relaxa-
tion states; Neher [1962], Oohashi et al. [2002], and Gingras et al.
[2014] for trance and shamanic drumming; Hayashi et al. [1992]
and Iwata et al. [2001] for sensory deprivation; Muthukumaraswa-
my et al. [2013], Tagliazucchi et al. [2016], and Carhart-Harris
et al. [2016] for hallucinogens; and Danielson et al. [2011] for epi-
leptic seizures). These frequency bands, in turn, are associated
with internally directed attention and attenuated interaction
with the external environment (e.g., Benedek et al. 2014).
These results suggest that internally directed attention might be
a common element of ASC. Supporting this view, practices such
as drumming, trance, endurance running, and focused meditation
simulate sensory deprivation to varying degrees and cause highly
focused internal attention, such that engagement with external
stimuli is highly attenuated (Castillo 1990; Dahl et al. 2015; Die-
trich 2003; Gingras et al. 2014; Hove et al. 2016; Lutz et al. 2008).
This disengagement of attention from external stimuli, known as
perceptual decoupling, helps to sustain internally directed tasks
(Hove et al. 2016; Smallwood et al. 2007; Smallwood et al.
2011; Spreng et al. 2010). Similarly, hallucinogens that induce
ASC impair reactions to external stimuli, but this occurs
because of the failure of sensory gating in ﬁltering out extraneous
stimuli, causing a failure to process incoming information ade-
quately (Carter et al. 2005; Geyer & Vollenweider 2008).
The second line of evidence comes from studies using neuroim-
aging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). Such studies suggest that one of the most common
effects of ASC, known as ego dissolution (the loss of a sense of
self), corresponds to disruptions to the default mode network
(DMN). The DMN is activated during self-referential processes,
such as autobiographical memory retrieval (Boly et al. 2008;
Buckner et al. 2008; Raichle et al. 2001). Studies using fMRI
have indicated that, during ASC induced by various methods –
including focused meditation (Brewer et al. 2011), hallucinogen
consumption (Carhart-Harris et al. 2012; 2016; Palhano-Fontes
et al. 2015; Tagliazucchi et al. 2016; Speth et al. 2016), and epilep-
tic seizures (Danielson et al. 2011) – the activation of the DMN
decreases, giving rise to ego dissolution. These studies also
reveal that, during ASC, regardless of induction method, high
functional connectivity is exhibited between three interacting
brain networks: default mode, frontoparietal control, and salience
(see Brewer et al. 2011; Carhart-Harris et al. 2016; Hasenkamp
et al. 2012; Hove et al. 2016; Tagliazucchi et al. 2016). The fron-
toparietal control network is responsible for cognitive control and
attention (Cole & Schneider 2007; Cole et al. 2014; Vincent et al.
2008). The salience network is responsible for detecting salient
events (internal or external) and for directing resources to the rel-
evant neural areas (Christoff et al. 2009; Menon & Uddin 2010;
Seeley et al. 2007). Enhanced connectivity among these three
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large-scale brain networks could explain some of the effects expe-
rienced by individuals during ASC, including the perceptual
decoupling discussed above.
This evidence supports the idea of a common neurophysio-
logical foundation to ASC. We further claim that a common
neurophysiological foundation to ASC can be of signiﬁcant explan-
atory value for a cultural evolutionary theory of shamanism. For
example, Singh’s theory notes but does not currently explain the
shaman’s insensitivity to pain, which, in our view, would be
explained by perceptual decoupling in ASC. Similarly, Singh’s
theory does not account for the shaman’s ritualistic practice of
using dark times of the day or dark spaces, such as caves; in our
view, this is explained by the relationship between sensory depri-
vation and ASC. Finally, Singh’s theory notes but does not cur-
rently explain why shamans believe they are not in control of
their experience, which, in our view, is explained by the experi-
ence of ego dissolution common to ASC. Although ASC and
their underlying mechanisms require further investigation, we
argue that it is too soon to reject the idea of a common neurophys-
iological foundation to ASC. Our argument is consistent with the
primary objectives of Singh’s cultural evolutionary theory and can
be considered an extension to that theory, because it can help
explain the universality, ubiquity, and endurance of shamanic
activities around the world.
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Abstract: Cultural evolutionary accounts of shamanism must explain the
cross-cultural recurrence and variation in associated practices. We
suggest that Singh’s account of shamanism would be strengthened by
considering the social functions of shamanism in groups. Shamanism
increases social group cohesion, making it distinct from other magico-
religious practices.
The term shamanism can be applied broadly to a wide set of
magico-religious practices that occur across cultures. Historical,
social, economic, and ecological factors contribute to how sha-
manistic practices are organized within cultural groups. Singh’s
account of the cultural evolution of shamanism provides a frame-
work for explaining cross-cultural variation and recurrence of
related practices. As the author notes, however, the current
“theory is agnostic as to whether shamans provide beneﬁts to
clients or groups” (sect. 3.4, para. 3). We argue that understanding
social functions is central to a cultural evolutionary account of sha-
manism. We discuss how the social nature of shamanism differen-
tiates it from practices related to other magico-religious practices
such as witchcraft. We also explain that the rituals associated with
shamanism provide a means of social cohesion that does not
always necessarily involve signaling cooperative intent (Watson-
Jones & Legare 2016).
Shamanism and traditional healing are distinct from practices
related to witchcraft. Winkelman’s (1986b) analysis of Standard
Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock & White 1969) data provided
evidence that magico-religious practices are related to political
and economic complexity. This analysis revealed that there are
four major practitioner types related to socioeconomic conditions:
1. The Healer Complex that includes shamans, shaman/
healers, and healers – the major distinction among these being
that the shamans and shaman/healers engage in trance states,
whereas the healers do not. Shamans were most associated with
hunter/gatherer societies, shaman/healers with all societies that
had agriculture, and healers with almost all societies that were
politically integrated.
2. Mediums who were characterized as engaging in possession-
like trance states and were found in agricultural and pastoralist
societies
3. Priests who were often leaders in societies with political inte-
gration and a hierarchical social structure that relied heavily on
agriculture
4. Malevolent practitioners who engaged in harmful activities
against others in societies with political integration. Across many
cultures, witchcraft practitioners are considered malevolent
actors. For example, in South Africa, witchcraft is a common attri-
bution for the ultimate cause of AIDS transmission (Legare &
Gelman 2008). Witchcraft practitioners are accused of using
their supernatural knowledge for individual gain and are not
regarded as working in the interests of all members of the commu-
nity. In many cases, once communities with shamans are inte-
grated into more complex socioeconomic systems, practitioners
associated with the predominant religion call out or label
shamans as witches to delegitimize their role within the commu-
nity (Winkelman 1986b).
Shamanism is communal. Many anthropologists have argued
that shamanism has social functions; it increases social cohesion
and cooperation. Shamans act as a conduit to the supernatural
realm, where they act on group members’ behalf and enable
rituals (often dramatic) that bind group members together for a
common goal. This is not to say that shamans act selﬂessly. As
the author notes, shamans often are prestigious members of
their communities. An account of the cross-cultural recurrence
and variation of magico-religious practices must take into
account the perceived, or actual, motivations of the practitioners.
The shaman reduces uncertainty surrounding important ﬁtness-
related events, such as illness, childbirth, hunting, and protection
from enemies. Healers are almost exclusively responsible for
dealing with illness-related issues, and witches are perceived as
focused on causing harm to others, most often surreptitiously. It
would be interesting to consider whether shamanism is ever prac-
ticed in secret – if shamanistic practices are done in isolation from
other community members, are they ever done without request or
knowledge of the community?
The importance of shamanism and similar practices for group
functioning is not necessarily related to signaling cooperative
intent, and the author provides a cogent argument against costly
signaling accounts of shamanism. Cooperative intent doesn’t get
off the ground without a preexisting, regularly maintained core
of social cohesion. The rituals associated with shamanism
provide a means of reafﬁrming social solidarity through shared
experience and providing an indication of commitment to group
norms.
Does shamanism professionalize because of its contribution to
group functioning? Singh argues that shamanism professionalizes
“because individuals typically must invest in transformative
practices to be considered capable of inﬂuencing uncertain out-
comes” (sect. 5.1, para. 4). In this way, the professionalization
differs from that of practices related to technical knowledge.
Both expertise and group consensus increase perceptions of
ritual efﬁcacy (Souza & Legare 2011). We argue that the
professionalization of shamanism also is related to the function
it serves for groups. As the earliest ritual practitioners, shamans
provided a means of group cohesion that was, and is, essential
for small-scale societies.
The deﬁning characteristics of shamanism come partly from its
relationship to social group dynamics and the beneﬁts its practices
provide for social cohesion. Singh’s framework of the cultural evo-
lution of shamanism neglects an essential explanatory feature of
shamanism: the social beneﬁts it provides to human groups.
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